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Abstract
This paper presents a simulation-based approach to developing strategies aimed at countering online disinformation and misinformation. This disruptive technology experiment incorporated a synthetic environment component, based on an adapted SusceptibleInfected-Recovered (SIR) epidemiological model to
evaluate and visualize the effectiveness of suggested
solutions to the issue. The participants in the simulation were given two realistic scenarios depicting a
disinformation threat and were asked to select a number of solutions, described in Ideas-of-Systems (IoS)
cards. During the event, the qualitative and quantitative characteristics of the IoS cards were tested in a
synthetic environment, built after a SIR model. The
participants, divided into teams, presented and justified their strategy which included three IoS card selections. A jury of subject matter experts, announced
the winning team, based on the merits of the proposed
strategies and the compatibility of the different cards,
grouped together.

1 Introduction
Online disinformation (false information deliberately
intended to mislead) has emerged as one of the most
serious challenges in the era of digital information. For
example, disinformation related to a pandemic, such as
the COVID-19 one, can both exacerbate a health crisis
and have implications for the cohesiveness and unity
of international security organizations and institutions.
Starting in early 2020, both state and non-state actors
began carrying out disinformation campaigns aimed at
exploiting the pandemic to instill fear, create distrust,
and destabilize Western communities. Pandemic-related disinformation was used as a weapon to undermine
NATO and U.S. forces in multiple countries such as

Latvia, Poland, and Lithuania (BBC, 2020). Disinformation campaigns are slowing the response to the pandemic and weakening confidence in local authorities
and international entities (e.g., WHO, NATO, EU). Examples of the harmful effects of these campaigns include fake letters and emails that aim to instill fear in
communities which have a NATO presence.
The need for virtual environments or "synthetic environments" has been repeatedly recognized by NATO
and by leading think tanks such as the Atlantic Council (Daw, 2005; Harper, 2020). Synthetic environments
(henceforth referred to as SENs) such as flight simulators have also been in use continuously. Scenarios involving kinetic warfare can be modeled and simulated much more easily than scenarios involving non-kinetic aspects such as disinformation and strategic decision making. However, today's 'gray zone conflicts'
(Chipman, 2018; Spitzack, 2018) have created a pressing need for simulation-based wargaming approaches
to such non-kinetic topics. COVID-19 disinformation
campaigns – the topic used in this experiment – is a
suitable example for such an issue, requiring immediate attention. In the application reported here a SEN
is adapted aimed at making people filter, refine, and
combine the best solutions to the given problem (in
the form of a scenario). Thus the virtual environment
helps evaluate potential solutions to the disinformation
problem being faced by NATO in a variety of domains.
This paper describes a successful application of
SEN in the context of a wargame sponsored by NATO.
It is the first study to describe the application of computational simulation methods to facilitate a virtual
wargame in an international security context, with the
application in this instance to strategies for combatting
the spread of disinformation. Here the dynamics associated with COVID-19 disinformation served as a
foundation for the scenarios used in the simulation.
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Much like a pandemic, disinformation and misinformation spread across communities and cast doubt in
perceptions of security. Drawing on this parallel, a
Susceptible-Infected-Resistant (SIR) model (Kermack
& McKendrick, 1927) was chosen as the basis of the
SEN for the war-simulation, described in this paper,
to visualize and illustrate not only the detrimental and
rapidly expanding consequences from disinformation,
but also the potential solutions to this issue.
The study makes several contributions. First, it is
a case study examining the implementation of SENbased virtual war-game simulation that brought together participants in multiple NATO countries. Second, the SEN itself applies a novel SIR model customized to the problem of disinformation spread.
Third, in the context of the SEN scenario case study, a
series of new proposed technical strategies for combatting the spread of disinformation were tested through
the wargame, providing a novel evaluation of these
open-innovation-challenge sourced technological options. This paper's contributions thus include a case
study evaluating the application of the SEN to multilocation virtual-wargaming by NATO, the modified
SIR model which was the basis for the SEN, and the
assessment and evaluation of the anti-disinformation
technologies through the SEN-based virtual wargame.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows.
Section 2 provides an overview of the structure and
sequencing of components of the experiment. Section
3 introduces SIR epidemic models, and the history
of their adaptation to the context of disinformation
spread. Section 4 describes the integration of the virtual environment as a component of the virtual wargame,
the purpose to which these were applied in this case:
evaluating potential technological tools proposed to
NATO for countering disinformation spread. Section 5
describes the results of the case study: how application of SEN as part of a virtual wargame played out,
and the results of this application for the evaluation of
the technology proposals. Section 6 outlines what was
achieved with the simulation and the limitations of the
experiment.

2 Project Structure
This study developed a SEN (Synthetic Environment)
based on the SIR model as a core element of an internet-based virtual-wargaming exercise. The SEN was
intended to use a distributed online format to help
participants understand the problem of disinformation
more deeply by modeling the dynamics that dictate the
spread of both disinformation (i.e., false information
intended to mislead) and misinformation (i.e., false information that is not spread with the intention to deceive) within social networks. At the same time it was
also intended to help the organizers develop and evaluate solutions that can help counter such campaigns.
The simulation described in this paper presents an
innovative approach that integrates a Disruptive Technology Experiment (DTEX). The Disruptive Technol-

ogy Experiment (DTEX) is a NATO wargame designed by the NATO ACT Innovation Hub. DTEX is
designed to test ideas and technologies that can solve
problems for NATO. For this purpose, the simulation
described in this paper was combined with the SEN
that mimics the dynamics of disinformation and misinformation spread. The SEN, used in this simulation
was an adaptation of an epidemiological SIR model
used to understand the spread of diseases.
The overall experimental structure was as follows:
1. Building on a classic agent-based SIR model
(Stonedahl & Wilensky, 2008), a model of the
epidemic spread of disinformation in a network
was created. This served as the SEN in the experiment.
2. Through an innovation challenge, proposed technological solutions to the challenge of disinformation spread were collected and summarized for
experiment participants.
3. Experts rated the likely impact of the technological solutions for the parameters of the SEN.
4. Wargame participants were recruited, and two
teams were created. Teams were briefed on the
disinformation spread scenario and the technological solutions. Teams were given access to the
SEN.
5. Teams communicated with each other using synchronous online communication to develop
strategies involving selections of technological
solutions.
6. Teams presented their solutions and were judged
both on the basis of their presentation and on the
duration of the disinformation 'infection' after the
SEN parameters were modified based upon their
proposed solution.
7. The research team evaluated the SEN and considered modifications to the model, and evaluated
the proposed technological solutions.
This amalgamated approach has been used to test 46
suggested solutions to counter disinformation that
were collected through an open innovation challenge –
a competition between different individuals or entities
intended to introduce a solution to a problem. The core
activity in this simulation involved two teams which
competed against each other to identify the best of the
open-innovation-challenge sourced ideas that solved
problems detailed in realistic scenarios. The teams in
the disinformation wargame or DTEX assessed the
merit of the ideas qualitatively and then quantitatively, using the SEN environment, to decide the best solutions for each scenario that they were given.

3 The SIR Model
3.1 Applicability of SIR Models to Disinformation Models
Susceptible-Infected-Recovered (SIR) models such as
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the one applied to create the synthetic environment
(SEN) used in this study have a long history of application across many fields. These models began in epidemiology in the 1920s with work by William Ogilvy
Kermack and Anderson Gray McKendrick (Kermack
& McKendrick, 1927), but have also long been applied
to study the transmission of ideas, narratives, and rumors (Goffman & Newill, 1964; Daley & Kendall,
1964). These models capture key aspects relevant to
the spread of disinformation and misinformation in
social networks, and provide a parsimonious way to
characterize components of the strategic situation
faced by those seeking to influence information
spread.
SIR models include a population consisting of individuals or agents of at least three types: susceptible,
infected, and recovered or resistant1. Transition probabilities in the SIR model govern the movement of
agents from one state to another. Solutions for SIR
models have been examined numerically, through simulations, and in recent years for specific parameter values exact analytical solutions have been computed as
well (Harko et al., 2014).
The typical results of a SIR model run involve initial infection spread as infected individuals initially
encounter mostly susceptible individuals. Then, a peak
level of infection intensity as recovery and less availability of susceptible individuals balances new infections. Lastly, there is typically a decline in the number
of infected individuals as recovery / resistance combine with diminished numbers of susceptible individuals to end the epidemic, often before all susceptible individuals have become exposed. There are several SIR
model variants with alternative assumptions. For example, in the SIS model recovered agents remain susceptible, while in the SIR model, recovered agents are
no longer susceptible. In the SIRS model, resistance
to infection fades over time. The SEIHFR model has
six categories, adding Exposed (but not yet symptomatic), Hospitalized (and thus perhaps less infectious),
and Funeral (dead, not buried, and hence potentially
still infectious) categories and has been used to model
Ebola epidemics (Drake et al., 2015). The model variant used in this project allows for a possibility that infected agents who recover will transition to either the
susceptible (S) or resistant (R) categories. Section 3.2
describes how we modified the standard SIR model to
fit with the disinformation context.
SIR and related models have long been recognized
as an effective framework for studying the spread of
misinformation and disinformation. Key early work in
the 1960s by Goffman and Newill (Goffman & Newill,
1964>) and Daley and Kendall (Daley & Kendall,
1964) pioneered the application of SIR and related
models to the spread of information and rumors. These
authors noted that the spread of ideas or information,
like the spread of an infection, involved transmission
from one individual to another, and that the SIR framework could provide a fruitful approach for modeling

this process. At the same time, the models also account
for a range of potential modifications such as effects
of encountering other infected and/or resistant individuals.
The SIR model has been applied widely to information and idea transmission in fields including politics, economics, marketing, health, and communication. For example, recent work by Nobel prize winning economics professor Robert J. Schiller (Schiller,
2019), applies SIR epidemic models to understand the
role of narratives in shaping economic behavior across
a wide range of domains from speculation in Bitcoin
to economic cycles, stock market bubbles, and many
more. Work by Zhao, Weng and co-authors has expanded study of the spread of competing ideas and the
dynamics of when and how ideas go 'viral' in social
networks (Weng et al., 2012; Weng et al., 2013; Zhao
et al., 2013). Bauckhage and colleagues examined attention to social media services (Bauckhage et al.,
2014) and viral videos (Bauckhage et al., 2015). Internet memes can also be effectively modeled using an
SIR framework, and Beskow and co-authors extended this work to study the evolution of political memes
(Beskow et al., 2020). Across domains, epidemic models have provided useful insights into idea, information, and disinformation transmission.
One important distinction between the models involves whether agents assort at random or exist in a
network structure. Random assortment is simpler to
model for obvious reasons, but network structures often are particularly important for modeling transmission of ideas in realistic settings because they allow
for differences in influence between actors. The most
relevant models for the analysis of disinformation involve models with network effects and these models
are often best analyzed using agent-based models in
which the network structure can be directly analyzed
(Ji et al., 2017). Infection of widely followed and trusted sources or sites has the potential to super-spread
disinformation.

3.2 The SIR Synthetic Environment
(SEN): Configuration and Settings
Because of the potential for greater realism in a network model, we model disinformation spread in an
agent-based network. The networked disinformation
spread model used to create the SIR based synthetic
environment (SEN) in the wargame was developed by
modifying and adapting the "virus on a network" SIR
model presented by Stonedahl and Wilensky (2008).
The model was programed in NetLogo, an opensource platform for agent-based modeling (Wilensky,
1999). For the purposes of the synthetic environment,
the software was used to mimic and visualize the
spread of disinformation. As mentioned previously in
Section 3.1, related SIR models have a long history
of application across many fields and in spite of their
highly abstract and reductionist style, the SIR model
can effectively capture the way in which disinforma-
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Table 1. SEN Baseline Inputs constructing the environment in which DTEX was executed.
Variable
Reference
Code

Variable (SEN Slider)

Baseline
Value

Explanation

Q

Total number-of200
nodes

Represents the total number of "people" in the virtual world.
This number will remain the same throughout the experiment.
Everyone is interconnected and shares information constantly,
i.e., during every tick. The tick is the only unit of time in this
SEN. In the beginning of each simulation, every node is treated as being susceptible to disinformation. Susceptible nodes are
represented as blue stick figures.

N

average-nodedegree

20

The average number of 'people' each person is connected to.
This number will remain the same throughout the experiment.

A

initial-outbreak-size

15

The initial number of 'bad actors' who have opinions that are
factually incorrect. Bad actors are represented as yellow stick
figures.

Β

disinformation5%
spread-chance

Represents the probability of yellow nodes spreading their
opinions to their nodes in each tick.

T

fact-check-fre10 ticks
quency

Represents how often each node fact-checks information before
sharing it with others connected to that node. The baseline value indicates that, on average, each node fact-checks only 1 out
of 10 times.

Γ

recovery-chance 5%

Represents the probability of a yellow node recovering from
disinformation.

P

gain-resistance-chance

5%

Represents the probability of a node becoming immune to future disinformation altogether. Immune nodes are represented
as green stick figures.

Ψ

resistancefact-checkchance

0%

Represents the probability that a node which has become immune will 'push back' against disinformation by causing connected infected nodes to fact check.

tion spreads through a network of people.
Agents exist in a spatially clustered networked
structure as in Stonedahl and Wilensky (2008). The
configuration of our model, illustrated in Table 1, is
made possible by initial settings which include the
total number-of-nodes (agents in the SEN), the
average-node-degree, showing how many other agents each agent in the SEN is connected to, the
initial-breakout-size, depicting the scale of
the disinformation spread, and by a series of transition
or transmission probabilities which we describe below.
Each node can be in one of three states - susceptible (S), infected (I), and resistant (R) (Stonedahl
& Wilensky, 2008). Susceptible (S) are vulnerable to
disinformation due to low levels of awareness of the
issue, lack of rational/critical thinking abilities, and/
or other similar limitations. Infected (I) agents have
been deceived by disinformation and perceive narratives spread by malicious actors as credible and trust-

worthy. Infected nodes tend to spread the information
they have received and believed, thus becoming unwitting participants in the spread of disinformation or
misinformation. Infected nodes are not always aware
that they have been 'infected' at least until they 'factcheck'. Even those who do fact-check may still remain
'infected'. Therefore, not all infected nodes 'recover'
from the condition of being infected. Resistant (R)
agents are no longer vulnerable to disinformation due
to fact-checking habits, high levels of awareness and
rational/critical thinking abilities, and other cognitive
and situational factors. The use of the term resistant
which we adopt from Stonedahl and Wilensky (2008)
is somewhat at variance with the use of the term recovered in some SIR models, but it is appropriate in our
context as we distinguish between recovered agents.
Several parameters govern the transition of agents
from one state to another. Infected agents spread disinformation to connected uninfected agents with a spec-
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ified probability β. Infected agents also engage in fact
checking with a specified frequency τ. When fact
checking occurs, agents potentially recover (with a
specified probability γ) with some failing to develop
ongoing resistance to future infection by disinformation (returning to susceptible) and some developing resistance to future infection (with probability ρ.) Unlike most SIR models of disease, in the disinformation
model, we also allow for the possibility that resistant
agents connected with others infected with disinformation will push back, triggering additional fact checking. With a specified probability (ψ) a resistant agent
may trigger fact checking among infected network
connections and thereby potentially induce recovery to
a susceptible state or the development of resistance.
In every step of the simulation (represented by a
tick), each infected agent, marked by a red node, attempts to infect all of its connections with the disinformation. As a consequence, susceptible connections,
marked with green nodes, may or may not get infected. The probability of infection is determined by β
the disinformation-spread-chance setting.
This characteristic represents the real-world equivalent
of falling prey to a misleading headline, or to propaganda designed to elicit an emotional response favoring the actor spreading the false information. People that are resistant, marked with gray nodes, do not
get infected. This represents the real-world equivalent
of highly-aware people who have fact-checked and/
or critically analyzed the disinformation and are no
longer susceptible to it.
As opposed to this, infected people, marked with
red nodes, are not always aware that they have been
'infected' by false information. In this model, every
person has the potential to conduct a fact-check with
a probability, which is controlled by τ, the factcheck-frequency setting. This represents the real-world event of a learning process in which an individual is being told by a person or an outlet they trust,
in verbal or written form, that a particular piece of information is false.
If an agent successfully discovers through a fact
check that they have indeed been 'infected', there is a
chance that they might 'recover', i.e., get reliable and
credible information. The probability of such a recovery is controlled by γ, the recovery-chance setting in the model. At the same time, a person's 'recovery' does not mean they will never get infected again.
An appropriate analogy would be that one single human can get scammed or fall victim of phishing attacks
many times. Therefore, some nodes may get infected
again (modeled by a return to the susceptible group),
some may not.
The probability of gaining this 'resistance' or 'immunity' is controlled by ρ, the gain-resistancechance setting. When a person becomes resistant,
the links between them and their connections are darkened, since they are no longer possible vectors for
spreading misinformation. Figure 1 shows a screen-

Final SEN Disinformation OTEX

b-~i~

Figure 1. The Synthetic Environment (SEN) used in
the simulation.
shot of the simulation in its final stage.
As a result of feedback concerning the match between epidemiological models and the disinformation
context in the SEN, we also modified the SIR model to
allow for the potential that resistant individuals might
actively resist the spread of disinformation triggering
fact checks by connected infected agents with probability ψ.
Figure 2 illustrates the impact of differences in the
model parameters in the simulation. The key point is
that the outcome of a model run is highly contingent
upon the parameters. With the same starting values except for the frequency of fact checking (τ), the panel
on the left follows a trajectory in which a severe infection develops (fact checking occurs only every 10
ticks). The panel on the right follows a trajectory in
which a more rapid development of resistance more
rapidly ends the spread of disinformation and prevents
it from ever simultaneously attracting a majority of the
population (fact checking occurs every tick).
All simulation parameters could potentially be influenced by the teams playing the DTEX wargame
through their strategic choices, as will be discussed in
Section 4. This modification of parameters was one
of the two ways the wargame-based test of the implementation of the anti-disinformation-spread technologies was evaluated. One half of the choice of the winning team was based upon which team's SEN inputs
led to the most rapid elimination of the disinformation
in the model (the lowest number of ticks at the end of
the simulation). Teams were also judged on their argument concerning the choice of technologies and the
strategy for deploying them.

4 DTEX War Game
4.1 DTEX Process
The DTEX Process used in this simulation was adapted from NATO's Disruptive Technology Assessment
Game (DTAG) structure. The latter "is a table-top
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time

infected

susceptible
resistant

infected

Figure 2. Example model runs with different fact check frequencies.

seminar wargame, used to assess potential future technologies and their impact on military operations and
operating environment" (NATO ACT, 2010). Similarly
to DTAG, DTEX also adopts the seminar wargame
core, but reveals some more nuances in the way the
simulation was conducted - in a fully online, synchronous environment.
The DTEX Process, illustrated in Figure 3, incorporated five steps, as follows. First, the participants
studied the scenario and the issues described in it. The
exact text of the scenarios can be found in Appendix
2. They were also given some supplementary materials
and had the opportunity to receive guidance about the
scenario and the solutions from a facilitator. Second,
the participants reviewed the IoS cards (see Appendix
3) with proposed solutions. Third, each participant individually made a choice of three IoS cards which they
found suitable to resolve the issues at hand. Fourth,
participants discussed their choices with their teams
and debated the rationales behind their choices. Fifth,
each of the two teams deliberated on a final selection
of IoS cards, based on the merits of the suggested solutions, their combined, synergetic effects, and the impact of the entire set of cards, as tested in SEN. After this process was completed, the participants prepared one-slide presentations with their choices, defended their strategy, and the winner was announced
by a subject matter expert, who served as a judge.

4.2 Scenarios
The scenarios with which the participants in the simulation were presented focused on social media disinformation. They presupposed that the Supreme Allied
Commander Transformation (SACT) formed a small

/ Team1

~ - - - - -----..,
Technology-Led
Solutions

Scenario
Briefing;
loS Card s

~

~
Structured
Data Capture

Team2

Figure 3. The DTEX Process.
task force that will assist an Allied Command Operations (ACO) team in the ongoing fight against disinformation and the participants were a part of it. Next, they
were asked to select three IoS cards (described in Section 4.3) which addressed the various specific issues
underscored in both scenarios. The teams qualitatively evaluated the merits of each IoS card (and the combined impact of the chosen cards) and after they made
their final choice of IoS cards, the quantitative effects
of their choice of IoS cards, based on the expert ratings, was also tested in the SEN provided to them and
their facilitator. Teams did not have direct access to the
expert ratings of the cards. The faster the SEN eliminates the spread of dis/misinformation (fewer ticks to
elimination), the better. The winning team was chosen
based on both their rationale for their IoS card choices
and on the temporal impact of their choices within the
SEN. Equal weight was given to these two criteria to
make sure that the solution is supported by qualitative
and quantitative factors.
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INPUT: Social Media, Twitter, Facebook posts/comments,
etc.

OUTPUT: Advice on crafting messages based on pu bl ic
sentiment to fill in gaps left by official messages sen t out.

#7 I Combat Misinformation
Through Social Media

PROCESS: Use of KT methods. Detection of arising trends
and research on the regio n's people and habits to
understand what style of res ponse must be crafted.

OFFERINGS: Tools for policy makers to optimally craft
messages based on public sentiment gleaned from social
media; 'Analysis -primer': enable rapid analysis of social
media discourse to identify local and regiona l trend s in
misinformation, stigma, and fear.

SUPPORTED TECHNOLOGIES: Automated algorit hms.
Stakeholder engage ment. Social media trend and
sentiment analysis, key informant int erviews. Use of plain
language research, behavioral psychology, and adult
education princ iples.

TECHNOLOGY: Knowledge Translation: iterative cycle of
knowledge creation, disseminat ion and implementation
of ev idence into practice and policy.

ADVANTAGES: Places high priority in ensuring
genera lizability and specificity in the usage of tools;
International networks with stakeholders from a variety
of countries.
LIMITATIONS: How to ensure accuracy in iden t ifying
sentiment t rends7 How is the resu lti ng crafted message
tested?

Figure 4. Outline of an IoS Card.

4.3 DTEX IoS Cards
As mentioned in Section 4.1 and Section 4.2, scenario
play involved a choice of IoS cards by participants. As
for the structure of the IoS cards, as shown in Figure
4, each card consists of various sections describing the
technology intended to serve as a solution to the problem of disinformation on social media. In the first one,
called offerings, the objectives of the technology are
outlined, and then the technology itself is introduced
through a brief overview. Next, the second section of
the cards summarizes the input, the output, the process
the technology is using to achieve its goals, and the
supported technologies in which it will operate. The
third and last section of the cards highlights advantages and limitations of the technology. The purpose of
this section is to guide participants in their choices, as
they could not obtain information about the proposed
technologies directly from the contributors in the NATO Innovation Challenge through which these ideas
were gathered. Description of the features of all IoS
cards is available in the Appendix 3.
In addition to the content summary of each card,
the subject matter experts invited to contribute to this
simulation assigned each IoS card a specific impact.
The latter was expressed in numerical value calculated
as the average of the expert ratings and contributed to
visualizing the solutions in SEN. Figure 5 shows the
worksheet with all of the IoS cards' SEN inputs that
was compiled and used by the facilitators to coordinate
the team's activities and to process the inputs in SEN
for the participants during the simulation.
Each of the categories of impact on the SEN (A
through E) shapes elements of the simulation environ-

ment (e.g., fact check frequency τ, probability of disinformation spread β, etc.). Participants did not directly
receive information about the ratings on the cards they
received, but the ratings informed the way in which
the simulated SIR model in the scenarios was modified
as a result of group choices. The rated impacts of the
cards are discussed in Section 5.2.

4.4 The role of the participants
As mentioned in Section 4.2, the participants in the experiment were asked to select three IoS cards and explain why they are the best choices to address the issues highlighted in the scenario. The participants also had to identify the priorities to which they adhered
when choosing the cards. These priorities included
five different objectives - identification of malicious
communication material online, categorization of information (real vs. fake), attribution (finding sources
of fake information), additional analyses (processing
and analysis of collected information to fulfill other
objectives), visualization of analyses, and mitigation
of effects (countering disinformation and their effects
by shielding the audience being targeted, disseminating counternarratives, etc.) After completing the selection of IoS cards, the participants were invited to test
their choices in the SEN, where both the individual
effects of their choices and their combined synergetic
effects were visualized and assessed. Lastly, during a
confrontation session between the different teams, the
participants presented their proposed plan to the jury,
which consisted of subject matter experts on the topic
of disinformation.
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Figure 5. Final SEN impacts for IoS Cards.

5 Results
This section discusses the results of the DTEX simulation. The DTEX event was well organized, the basic structure of the simulation worked well, and participants found the SEN a useful component in conjunction with their deliberations. Participants used the
SEN during their deliberations to visualize the consequences of different strategies. The SEN was also used
as one component of judging team decision-making.
It also helped organize and structure discussion of the
merits of different technologies aimed at combatting
the spread of disinformation. A framework of two scenarios (see Appendix 2 for details) of increasing complexity was deemed appropriate, and seemed to help
engender participant interest, engagement, thought,
and analysis.

5.1 Group Dynamics Qualitative Observations
In the first scenario, Group 2 seemed less organized
than Group 1. Group 1 used screen share capabilities
more effectively to help ground discussion of alternative cards, while Group 2 seemed to struggle a bit more
to reach consensus, and as a result did not develop as
effective and clear a set of plans for how to address
the challenges in the scenario, nor how to present their
plans.
In the second scenario, one of the members of
Group 2 opened the discussion with a proposal that
helped set the tone for a more productive deliberative
process which set the stage for the Group 2 win in
scenario 2. With her leadership they identified goals
and reached consensus about them. Then they devel-

oped a combination of technology cards that would allow them to effectively achieve those goals. The structure of the deliberations could have potentially benefitted from more involvement by the moderators and
a division of the cards into different categories (e.g.,
dashboards versus tools for intervention). By the second scenario, Group 2 seemed to have begun to do this
kind of sorting of cards into categories on its own, and
that process helped the group reach a more effective
path to a solution, while Group 1 in the second scenario seemed to have more trouble structuring their deliberations and combining the synergies of the cards.
Group 2 reached near-consensus with sufficient time
remaining for multiple model runs in the SEN to test
which of two alternative strategies would lead to better results. Ultimately, choice of the strategy rejected
by Group 2 through this process would have led to less
successful model runs than Group 1, and potentially to
a loss in scenario 2, so the time the group was able to
invest in this aspect of the deliberation seems to have
been well spent.
The group dynamics described highlight some of
the skills and approaches which determined the winning group. In particular, leadership, level of organization and structure of the decision-making process,
along with an effective use of the technical capabilities
of the SEN to which the participants had access contributed to Group 1's better performance in the first
scenario, and Group 2's in the second scenario. These
conclusions about the group dynamics in DTEX provide important insights for the successful selection
process of technological solutions with a high level of
impact against disinformation. They may be used in
future iterations of this simulation to increase the pro-
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Table 2. Cards with largest impacts on each aspect of SEN based upon expert ratings.
A Reduces Initial Outbreak Size
Best: #33. Covid-19
MAP Media Analytics
Platform. Second Best: A
tie between #7, Combat
Misinformation through
Social Media, and #35
Profiling
fake
news
spreaders on Social Media.

β Reduces Dis- τ Increases
information
Fact
Spread
Check
Chance
Frequency
Best: A three
way tie between
#20 DeepDetector, #5 SGOOF,
and #35 Profiling fake news
spreaders
on
Social Media.

Best: #29
Intelligence
Dashboard
Second
Best: #45
mLAi Analytics.

ductivity and competitiveness of both teams, thus ensuring a better learning experience for the participants
and a more careful re-assessment of the IoS cards, previously ranked by experts, based on their characteristics.

5.2 IoS Cards: Strengths and Synergies
As noted at the outset, the purpose of the SEN (SIR
model) and wargame virtual simulation in this case
was to evaluate proposed anti-disinformation technological tools submitted to NATO through an innovation challenge. This section discusses the results of
that evaluation which is based upon the totality of the
information collected including the actions and arguments made by wargame participants, expert rankings,
and simulation results.
Prior to the DTEX wargame the IoS cards were
ranked by experts for their ability to impact five different characteristics of disinformation spread in the
SEN, and then evaluated by the competing teams to
construct compelling and synergistic combinations of
the cards. The characteristics were: A - Reduces Initial
Outbreak Size, β - Reduces Disinformation Spread
Chance, τ - Increases Fact Check Frequency, γ - Increases Recovery Chance, and ρ - Increases Gain Resistance Chance. The probability that a resistant agent
will trigger a fact check by a connected infected agent
(Ψ) was added after DTEX based on the simulation experience and so is not included in this section. Based
upon the expert rankings and the results of the
wargame, including qualitative analysis of participant
discussion and arguments we have categorized each
card in Table 2 in terms of the best card(s) for addressing each aspect.
Containing initial outbreak size is potentially very
important, especially if once the outbreak is identified,
effective tools are available to curtail the spread of the
outbreak. Card #33 was rated as providing the best impact on initial outbreak size. This technology provides
a dashboard for decision-makers that "monitors all as-

γ Increases
Recovery
Chance

ρ Increases
Gain Resistance Chance

Average Impact Z-score

Best:
#39
PULSE Second Best: #7
Combat Misinformation
Through Social
Media.

Best: A three
way tie between #7 Combat Misinformation
Through Social
Media, #9 Zetane, and #22
Nunki.

Best: #7 Combat Misinformation
Through Social
Media.

pects of the spread of information (about COVID-19)
and predicts what and how other topics will spread."
The key aspect of this platform for curtailing initial
outbreak size is that ideally this platform will allow
rapid identification of outbreaks of disinformation, allowing agile targeting responses to those outbreaks using various other tools before the outbreaks have time
to become widespread.
Once an outbreak of disinformation has begun,
a critical factor shaping its spread is the extent to
which individuals or media infected with disinformation spread it to others. The three best-rated cards for
curtailing the disinformation spread chance were implemented in different strategies, suggesting potential
for fruitful combination between these cards for larger impact. IoS card #5 SGOOF uses data-mining, classification, and machine learning classification to develop a 'truth score' and classification for information.
This could be fed into a dashboard similarly to #33, but
it also could potentially be used in public-facing applications. IoS card #20 DeepDetector is a more specialized software application aimed at detecting and identifying deep-fakes in video footage. The current prototype is asserted to have a 95-98% accuracy and could
provide an important tool both if fed into a dashboard
and as a public-facing application to allow for rapid
identification of likely faked video content in order to
catalyze actions to limit its spread. Another IoS card
- #35 Profiling fake news spreaders on Social Media
takes a somewhat different tactic. Potentialize synergizing with #5 and #20, this machine learning application focuses on the profiles of fake news spreaders instead of on the news content itself. This could provide
particularly valuable information in order to facilitate
rapid response to the spread of fake news that targets
accounts being used to spread disinformation.
Once disinformation has begun to spread widely,
combatting it involves in part triggering fact checking
that potentially leads individuals to believe they
should not trust the disinformation. The best rated card
for increasing fact check frequency was #29 Intelli-
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gence Dashboard. This dashboard proposal utilizes a
combination of AI and human fact checking to identify and classify the most prevalent information. As with
other dashboard proposals, the primary focus here is
on enabling decisionmakers to take effective actions
to increase fact check frequency or provide targeted
individuals with fact checks of disinformation which
they have been exposed to. Individuals who have come
to believe disinformation may eventually recover by
believing fact checks which disabuse them of belief
in the false narratives provided by the disinformation
source. The best rated card for increasing recovery
chance was #39 PULSE. This proposal emphasizes the
important counter-insurgency principle that all combatants are intelligence gatherers. It provides a framework for submissions from "front-line workers" to
identify and cluster information on unaddressed issues
and challenges. This could be an important component
of any dashboard, helping decision-makers operate
with better information concerning the current state of
play in the spread of disinformation, and potentially
facilitating the identification of unaddressed issues.
A key factor in ultimately containing a disinformation outbreak is the development of resistance to it
in the form of individuals who are no longer susceptible to the disinformation. Three technology cards received the highest ratings for this element: #7, #9, and
#22, and pursue two quite distinct strategies that would
need to be synergized for the largest impact. IoS card
#7 aims to achieve resistance through counter-spreading measures, a unique and very important aspect of
this card compared to most of the other proposed technologies. In essence, the strategy behind using it is
to achieve resistance to disinformation by identifying
potential spreaders, and swamping the disinformation
signal with alternative signals. This more active resistance by jamming disinformation signals moves beyond most other cards which emphasize identification
of disinformation rather than active counter-information measures. Card #9 Zetane is a dashboard that aids
in visualization of the geographic and regional trends
in false information spread. #22 Nunki is another dashboard application which focuses on alerts concerning
events and news spread, hopefully facilitating rapid response. Obviously, the dashboard applications would
be most fruitfully combined with other measures, such
as IoS card #7, since with dashboard strategies the resistance developed would involve societal level rapidresponse to renewed spread of disinformation.
Fortunately, as discussed above, multiple technologies can be combined to address the challenges of disinformation. However, if only a single technology was
to be used, the best overall technology in terms of impact relative to the others across the five categories is
#7 Combat Information Through Social Media. What
makes this strategy stand out is its emphasis on active
measures. The high ratings given this card suggest that
efforts to develop a suite of different active signaljamming measures to combat disinformation would be

well worth while. Combination of such measures with
good dashboard and intelligence to identify threats
would probably help to magnify the effectiveness of
this technology.

6 Conclusions
The simulation involving a virtual wargame using
SEN succeeded across several dimensions. The DTEX
project, described in this paper, set forth multiple objectives – producing ideas, testing them in a realistic
scenario and observing the visualized effects of these
ideas, educating the participants about the harmful effects of disinformation and the strengths and weaknesses of possible solutions, and testing the use of an
internet-based virtual wargame. The fact that DTEX
was conducted in a fully-online environment was also
a step forward toward making such simulations and
wargames more accessible across nations and thus
more inclusive, diverse, and valuable. Another benefit
of DTEX was that it created a collaborative setting
in which participants from different backgrounds can
contribute, as disinformation is a multidisciplinary
topic that is researched by scholars and practitioners
from various fields. The DTEX model also outlined
opportunities for development and testing of solutions
that pertain not only to other similar-to-disinformation
issues, such as propaganda, and recruitment by radical
organizations, but also to a wide range of other security issues, important to the international community.
One of the key elements of the DTEX war game
scenario design involves the opportunity for groups to
deliberate and play out the interaction between multiple technologies, as no single technology is likely to
solve all of the problems presented by the scenarios,
but some technologies are more compatible with each
other than others. Deliberations about the tradeoffs between technologies provide important data about the
challenges associated with integrating diverse (and potentially overlapping or competing) technologies to
solve a problem, and their potential synergies. Hence,
the experiment succeeded in building knowledge
about the potential of the technology choices and the
ways in which they could be effectively combined.
Another of the key elements of this study involved
the use of SENs to facilitate interaction and evaluation
in the context of a virtual wargame. Because the
wargame was played out virtually, participants could
be physically located in multiple NATO countries on
multiple continents. By applying an epidemic-spread
model to depict the spread of disinformation about the
COVID-19 pandemic, these environment help participants visualize, conceptualize, apply, and analyze the
consequences of the potential technological solutions
for disinformation spread. The simulation as a case
study demonstrated the utility of the SIR simulation as
SEN for the virtual wargame.
In the process of describing our study, we also
modified the SIR model to better capture some dynamics of disinformation flow, and those modifica-
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tions (e.g., the possibility that resistance itself may be
'catching') can be incorporated into subsequent models
of disinformation.
There were none the less some important limitations of this experiment. While the diversity of backgrounds of participants was a significant asset to the
experiment, it also revealed some inequality in terms
of how to best respond to the given scenario. For instance, students from political science backgrounds
generally demonstrate more awareness about the way
NATO is structured and how the different memberstates work together. At the same time, they may not
be equipped to assess the various technologies that
were presented to them in the form of IoS cards from
a more technical perspective. Another issue pertains to
the ability to operate the SEN in which the cards were
tested. In a fully asynchronous environment, which
has the ability to overcome limitations of different
time-zones, facilitators may not be able to be as helpful as they were in the synchronous online version of
DTEX which this paper describes.
Aside from these limitations, the goals for which
DTEX was designed and intended – innovation, education and collaboration, were successfully fulfilled
mainly because of the virtual environment that helped
participants. With the input and efforts of specialists
from various fields, the simulation will further evolve
and attempt to solve more of the problems of the future.
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Appendix 1. SIR model code
turtles-own
[
infected?
resistant?
fact-check-timer
]

;; if true, the turtle is infectious
;; if true, the turtle can't be infected
;; number of ticks since this turtle's last fact-check

to setup
clear-all
setup-nodes
setup-spatially-clustered-network
ask n-of initial-outbreak-size turtles
[ become-infected ]
ask links [ set color white ]
reset-ticks
end
to setup-nodes
set-default-shape turtles "circle"
create-turtles number-of-nodes
[
; for visual reasons, we don't put any nodes *too* close to the edges
setxy (random-xcor * 0.95) (random-ycor * 0.95)
become-susceptible
set fact-check-timer random fact-check-frequency
]
end
to setup-spatially-clustered-network
let num-links (average-node-degree * number-of-nodes) / 2
while [count links < num-links ]
[
ask one-of turtles
[
let choice (min-one-of (other turtles with [not link-neighbor? myself])
[distance myself])
if choice != nobody [ create-link-with choice ]
]
]
; make the network look a little prettier
repeat 10
[
layout-spring turtles links 0.3 (world-width / (sqrt number-of-nodes)) 1
]
end
to go
if all? turtles [not infected?]
[ stop ]
ask turtles
[
set fact-check-timer fact-check-timer + 1
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if fact-check-timer >= fact-check-frequency
[ set fact-check-timer 0 ]
]
spread-disinformation
do-fact-checks
tick
end
to become-infected ;; turtle procedure
set infected? true
set resistant? false
set color red
end
to become-susceptible ;; turtle procedure
set infected? false
set resistant? false
set color blue
end
to become-resistant ;; turtle procedure
set infected? false
set resistant? true
set color gray
ask my-links [ set color gray - 2 ]
end
to spread-disinformation
ask turtles with [infected?]
[ ask link-neighbors with [not resistant?]
[ if random-float 100 < disinformation-spread-chance
[ become-infected ] ] ]
end
to do-fact-checks
ask turtles with [infected? and fact-check-timer = 0]
[
if random 100 < recovery-chance
[
ifelse random 100 < gain-resistance-chance
[ become-resistant ]
[ become-susceptible ]
]
]
ask turtles with [infected? and any? link-neighbors with [resistant?] ]
[
if random 100 < resistance-fact-check-probability
[
if random 100 < recovery-chance
[
ifelse random 100 < gain-resistance-chance
[ become-resistant ]
[ become-susceptible ]
]
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]
]
end

NOTE: This model is a modified version of the NetLogo Virus on a Network model (Stonedahl & Wilensky,
2008), copyright 2008 Uri Wilensky. This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 3.0 License.
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Appendix 2. DTEX scenarios
Scenario 1
Background
The Supreme Allied Commander Transformation
(SACT) has handpicked you for a small task force
that will assist an Allied Command Operations (ACO)
team in the ongoing fight against disinformation. You
have been asked to pick 5 technologies (IoS cards) that
you believe will help solve the problems described in
the following scenario.
Note: Please stick to the details given in the IoS
cards. The only creative license you can take is during
the prediction and explanation of the outcomes in the
future (where the technologies you’ve chosen will be
implemented). Feel free to ask questions about the scenario, operating environment, and IoS cards. Your facilitator will be your main point of contact and will be
available in your zoom room at all times.

Description
1. In the midst of increased fear about new waves of
COVID-19, there has been a barrage of fake posts
across several social media platforms in multiple
languages claiming that there has been large outbreaks of COVID-19 within NATO forces that are
part of the Enhanced Forward Presence - a NATO-allied forward deployed defense and deterrence military posture in Central Europe through
Poland and Northern Europe through Estonia,
Latvia, and Lithuania.
2. NATO analysts have noticed that the dissemination of disinformation is happening largely
through numerous small-scale 'influencers' whose accounts are getting hacked or imitated.
These accounts are spreading different messages
depending on the populations they're targeting.
3. Highly graphic visuals and deep-fake videos are
being used to depict highly dramatized scenes
that are far from reality yet convincingly real.
Videos with fake information - in the form of text
alongside images - are the primary vectors. These
videos seem to be designed to elicit strong emotional responses that seem to have the ultimate
goal of creating a rift within NATO.
4. These social media posts are also well crafted.
The language and cultural contexts are too good
for AI to differentiate easily. Human-AI partnerships may be necessary. The type of fake personalities delivering these fake news reports also
seem to be very effective in making the message
look authentic. Forensic psychologists at NATO
claim that they will be able to solve part of the
disinformation problématique if more information about these 'talking heads' were made available to them.
5. The populations that were targeted by these dis-

information attempts need to be identified in order to target mitigation efforts towards the same
population. Managing such efforts also require
dashboards that aggregate and visualize data using maps and other tools.
You can use details from the following reports/articles
to guide and support your choices of IoS cards:
• Canadian-led NATO battlegroup in Latvia targeted by pandemic disinformation campaign
• Hackers Broke Into Real News Sites to Plant
Fake Stories
• Pillars of Russia's Disinformation and Propaganda Ecosystem (Infographics on pages 8, 10)

Expectations
1. Pick five IoS cards and explain why you think
they are the best choices to address the issues.
2. Develop a plan that leverages the five IoS cards
you chose - both their individual strengths and
their combined synergies. This plan should
counter or mitigate the effects of disinformation
campaigns. Explain how your IoS cards can combine their strengths.
3. Present your plan to the jury, during the 'confrontation session' with the other team and convince them that your plan is the better one. Focus
on explaining (a) how you plan to use the IoS
cards and how you plan to combine their
strengths, and (b) what effects you intend to
achieve through your plan. Below is the full list
of desired effects:
1. Identification of malicious communication
material online
2. Categorization of information (real v. fake)
3. Attribution: Finding sources of fake information
4. Additional Analyses: Processing and analysis of collected information to fulfill other
objectives
5. Visualization of analyses
6. Mitigation of Effects: Countering disinformation and their effects by shielding the audience being targeted, disseminating counternarratives, etc.

Scenario 2
Background
The Supreme Allied Commander Transformation
(SACT) has once again handpicked you for a small
task force that will assist an Allied Command Operations (ACO) team in the ongoing fight against disinformation. You have been asked to pick 5 technologies
(IoS cards) that you believe will help solve the problems described in the following scenario.
Note: Please stick to the details given in the IoS
cards. The only creative license you can take is during
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the prediction and explanation of the outcomes in the
future (where the technologies you’ve chosen will be
implemented). Feel free to ask questions about the scenario, operating environment, and IoS cards. Your facilitator will be your main point of contact and will be
available in your zoom room at all times.

Description
1. NATO
teams
have
been
monitoring
COVID-19-related disinformation efforts for a
while but are still not able to efficiently sort disinformation. Both bots and humans have been actively spreading disinformation but the teams are
not able to differentiate the sources. These efforts
seem to be targeting civilian populations across
NATO nations. These disinformation campaigns
are somehow able to target populations that seem
to have low levels of awareness of the real nature
of the pandemic and of the best practices to prevent spread. Experts suggest that such targeting is
meant to spread anxiety about the future.
2. Troves of data have been collected by NATO
teams which have been analyzing these bots.
However, analysts are no longer able to extract
actionable insights from these datasets. Team
leaders have been affected by sensory overload
caused by ineffective tools that are not able to aggregate and analyze such datasets.
3. Analysts have been manually aggregating and visualizing data points to present the big picture to
their leaders and other decision makers. This has
been drastically slowing down reaction times, allowing disinformation campaigns to spread virally in the meantime. Team leaders are skeptical of
tools that oversimplify analyses because they believe they can lead to serious oversights. Analysts
are not able to find tools that strike the right balance between sensory overload and potentially irresponsible reductionism.
4. NATO's sociologists and other interdisciplinary
researchers are also not able to extract useful insights from these large datasets. Their goal is to
connect bits and pieces, highlight similar narratives, and craft better counter-narratives and responses. These experts are also unable to obtain
real time feedback on the spread of disinformation.

5. NATO is interested in using these large datasets
to forecast future trends. Team leaders and policy
makers currently lack such tools in their planning
and decision-making processes.
You can use details from the following reports/articles
to guide and support your choices of IoS cards:
• NATO's approach to countering disinformation: a
focus on COVID-19
• 'Ghostwriter' Influence Campaign: Unknown Actors Leverage Website Compromises and Fabricated Content to Push Narratives Aligned with
Russian Security Interests
• NATO Chief Rebukes China Over Coronavirus
Disinformation

Expectations
1. Pick five IoS cards and explain why you think
they are the best choices to address the issues.
2. Develop a plan that leverages the five IoS cards
you chose - both their individual strengths and
their combined synergies. This plan should
counter or mitigate the effects of disinformation
campaigns. Explain how your IoS cards can combine their strengths.
3. Present your plan to the jury, during the 'confrontation session' with the other team and convince them that your plan is the better one. Focus
on explaining (a) how you plan to use the IoS
cards and how you plan to combine their
strengths, and (b) what effects you intend to
achieve through your plan. Below is the full list
of desired effects:
1. Identification of malicious communication
material online
2. Categorization of information (real v. fake)
3. Attribution: Finding sources of fake information
4. Additional Analyses: Processing and analysis of collected information to fulfill other
objectives
5. Visualization of analyses
6. Mitigation of Effects: Countering disinformation and their effects by shielding the audience being targeted, disseminating counternarratives, etc.
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Appendix 3. IoS Cards used in DTEX

INPUT: Raw information

INPUT: All articles, te,ct infomiation on the internet

OUTPUT: Vetted information onto a dashboard

#1 / Resiliency
OFFERINGS: Information sorted by teams, then put on
awebsite. Also available on a dashboard with
geographicriskassessment, flow of info from press and
monitoring socials.

TECHNOLOGY: Dashboard, website, CAIAC, SAGA
CRISIS

PROCESS: Information vetted, published, geographic
data is analyzed to determine hot spots and at risk
locations for fake news, TECHW..V-. provides
technologyto maintain data seoJrity
SUPPORTED TECHNOLOGIES: TECHWAN data
seruritV.CAIAC
ADVANTAGES: All the tectnology is already developed
and prototypes are far along, user friendly and easily
accessible, low cost since no new development
UMITATIONS: I-lard to hand process information,
relyingon outside company for data security, like all Al
makes as.sumptions, appears most of the vetting is
outsourced

OUTPUT: False or misleading subjects will be fiagged,
correctinformationlinkprovided

#2 / Machine Learning for False
Information Detection

PROCESS: n/ a
SUPPORTED TECHNOLOGIES: Al algorithm, Social
media platfomis, Data filtration, Machine learning

OFFERINGS: Fact check information released regarding
COVID-19 with verified health websites
TECHNOLOGY: Data identification and allocation,
Learning to recognize medical nuances through Act,
Comparative models to verify with WHO/CDC etc.,
Neural M<Khine Translation

ADVANTAGES: Encourages verified information by
health officials, offers option to mitigall:! false info and
how to deal with offenders, user friendly, provides true
information in re.ii time from verified health sources
LIMITATIONS: Strictly COVID relared as of now, Al
makes assumptions regarding language, Take lime to
develop comparative models, Computer
misunderstanding language/false categorization,
endanger lives, money to develop comparative mOOels

INPUT: Raw infonnation
INPUT: AII articles, text information on the internet
OUTPUT: l dentify misinformation in te~t/videos,
Mitigate, Aggregate info to public, Verified information

OUTPUT: Correct information, prediction of future
targeted population

#3 / Social Science and Target
Audience Analysis

OFFERINGS: Solution ID correct false information using
social media c1nd encouraging users to J)OSt vefified
information, Target Audience Analysis to determine

PROCESS : Encourages users to post correct info up to
50x a day, correct infom,ation floods through social
media
SUPPORTEDHCHNOLOGIES: Al algorithm for TAA,
social media wtlets, press sites

future ~at risk populations~

TECHNOLOGY: Social scieflce research, SOCial media
platforms, Socio-demographic data

ADVANTAGES: Far reaching and fast due to speed/reach
of social media, all technologies are already available and
have been successfully used by governments, low expense
technology already in use

#4 / Bountiful Intel
OFFERINGS: IJsers are given topics v.ith an as.sodated
bounty. Submitted information will be assigned
usefulness and veracity scores. High score user's
infom,ation will move to the top of the dashboard, and
they wi ll begivenabounty.
TECHNOLOGY : Blockchain and artificial intelligence
algorithms that assign use ratings to users, appear on a
dashboard

PROCESS: InformaUcn sorted and stored, as~r.ed son
and bounty is delivered according to score
SUPPORTEO TECHNOLOGIES: Dashboard, Artificial
intelligeoce/machiie learning, cloud of data, blockchc1in

ADVANTAGES: Quick access to information, incentive to
provide C01Tect info, relationships b/w users and NATO
can be anonymous, user friendly and easy to access
LIMITATIONS: Al makes assumptions, will take time to
sort information, false user ratings, no prototypes
available, will take time and money to develop software,
have to build a dashboard

UMITAllONS: Over intrusive data mining, possibility of
making incorrect predictiOns of ~at risk" populations, does
not identify fake news, and like all AI this process utilizes
assumptions

INPUT: News, social media
INPUT: Text, images
OUTPUT: singular~truth" in today's media/ provide
supplies to isolated person and team

OUTPUT: Truth score and categorization

#5/SGOOF

PROCESS: Categorize fake news, then feed in pieces of
infom,ation through multiple checkpoints l'mich when
finished will apply a truth score

OFFERINGS: Tool lhat can uf\de~nd and verify the

SUPPORTED TECHNOLOGIES: Social media, news
outlets, press, big data network

truthfulness of news in a real time process applying color
codil'\Q andascoretothefinalresult
TECHNOLOGY: Al software for categorization and data
consumption, data mining and analysis, blockchain

ADVANTAGES: SeclJre copies, real time trading,
security, transparency, safe exchanges and no third-party
involvements, low cost because technology all already in

#6 / Chronos
OFFERINGS: Display accurate news on ~Map of the
WorldH, provide a ~confidence Rating, H Automation
robots ,p!anfOf: allocation of supplies
TECHNOLOGY: Artificial intelligence, 5G, machine
learning, YR, aut<:mation, thermal scanning, facial
recognition

TECHNOLOGY: Knowledge Translation: iterative cycle of
knowledge creation, dissemination, and inplementation
of evidence into practice and policy.

ADVANTAGES: The technology is effective in fake news
identification and resource relocation, hi:Jh social
acceptability since data is soorced from exisUng
infomialion
UMITAllONS: Did not say how the technologies achieve
the 90c1I, vague description, wil l cost money for hardware,
SG, robotics technologies

INPUT: Social Media, Twitter, Facebookposts/comments,

INPUT: Data fromthevarioussourcesmentior.ed
OUTPUT: Data thatthecommanderscanusetoguide
their work

OUTPUT: Advice on crafting messages based on public
sentiment to fil l in gaps left by official messages sent out.

OFFERINGS: Tools for pdicy makers to optimally oaft
messages based on public sentiment gleaned from social
media; 'Analysis-primer': enable rapid analysis of social
media discourse to identify k.lcal and regional trends in
misinformation, stigma, and fear.

SUPPORTED TECHNOLOGIES: Artificial
inteHigence/machi1e learning, SG, VR, automation,
robotics, facialrecognition,etc.

LIMITATIONS: Over intrusive dara mining, like all Al
makes assurTVtions, utiliies a pre~xisting program 50
machire learning isn't compatible

'"·
#7 I Combat Misinformation
Through Social Media

PROCESS: Open Olronos software platform, it will
displays an acrurate digital calendar that allows the user
to see the past-present-future for any topics

PROCESS: Use of KT methods. Detection of arising trends
and research on the region's people and habits to
under-st.ind whilt style of response must be crafted.
SUPPORTED TECHNOLOGIES: AutO!Tlilted algorithms.
Stakeholder engagement Social media trend and
sentiment analysis, key informant interviews. Use of plain
language iesearch, behavioral psychology, and adult
education principles.
ADVANTAGES: Places high priority in ensuring
generalizability and specificity in the usage of tools;
International networks with stakeholders from a variety
ofcountries.
UMITAllONS: lt:>w to ensure acruraty in identifying
sentiment trends' How is the resulting crafted message
tested?

#B / Pronoia Project
OFFERINGS: Aggregare informaUon for government
leaderstouse.
TECHNOLOGY: Neigt'bofhood Watch, Google/Bing/Big
Tech, Municipal Traffic Feeds, Drooes/UAVs, Emergency
Service Frequencies, Amateur Ham Rad io.

PROCESS: Aggregare dara and place it in front of a
commander.
SUPPORTED TECHNOLOGIES: All listed. The project
does not seem to develop anything new, but rather
aggregate Info from a variety of Off-The Shelf Sources

ADVANTAGES: Data from a variety of sources, can check
against other sources. Neighboolood Watch is manned by
qualified personnel
LIMITATIONS: Tech and Ham Radios can provide
unreliable info, Municipal Traffic Camera Feeds may not
at-ways be available/dependent 01 city jurisdiction, Drone
battery life is< 30 minutes and has a high profile; display
of this info may be difficult
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INPUT: Jnforrnation··live news, social media, etc.

INPUT: Fact-<hecked articles, wireservkes, established
newspapers, authenticated government websites.

OUTPUT: Possible fuke news, categoril.!tion as re<1I or

fake, identification of viral/keywords, explar.ations for
thesec.ategorizations

#9 /

PROCESS: Pull

Zetane

information from

live

news, social

media,

and websites to diStinguish fake from real using viral

media notifications from fact checking websites, means to
flag news, and categorization based on keywords

#10 / Automated Policy
Intelligence Platform

OFFERINGS: Identify false information and provide a

geographic representation of regional trends and
d issmiination of fake news.

SUPPORTI:0 TECHNOLOGIES: Deep neural n&we rh,
nab.Jral language processing neural networlls

TECHNOLOGY: Monitoronline information; Automate

the gathering & categorization of misinformation;
Geog@!lhic: Information System; View and extract info
from INe news; Monitor specific websites/social media,

ADVANTAGES: . Visualization of the black bo,c/interr.al
reasoning of Al serves as a check/balance and reduces the
risk of adversarial attacks with corrupted data; 2.
Dt-namic: can modify the situation dashboard and
U?9rade Al models.

regiona l trending topics, and pertinent keywords; AI
categorization

OFFERINGS: Reduce infofTlliltiOO overload by acting as
an 'information triage' resource and providing clients with
fact-checked, reliable informabon relevant to their
strategiceffortsasanorganization.
TECHNOLOGY: Analyzes data and converts it to
numef"ical data that enables predictive analytics

UMITATIONS: Leaming curve for use, tech involved may
be expensive

Cognition

SUPPORTED TECHNOLOGIES: Volume based analytical
measures, official sector sources, cloud platform, AP!,
customiZable dashboards.

ADVANTAGES: trad( mome.,tum and time series oevelopment
ofanissue,~rify ifanissue lsrhetoricortrueaction,erisure
indefi nte~toartifilct$,limit.intlkeofdiltlto
fact-checked media, uses smartseardling tools to sift through
content Q.Jiddy and effectively, tedl is ~elSY to master"

INPUT: Information from remote scanning tedmology
(thermal scanners, oximeters,vocalanalysis,c.amera
surveillance, internet crawl ing, Al)
OUTPUT: Advisement on the best
plans/decisions/resource allocation that can be made by
NATO leaders.

OUTPUT: A lal)ej warning that the content may contain
fake news

#11 / Empowered

PROCESS: Automated collection and initial assessment
using technology that determir.es key words of interest to
the client. Aggregate relevant content and send to client.

LIMITATIONS: Ensuring cdlection (i news sent to dientsis net
liased(rantll!misused);ma~~tion.

INPUT: Articles, te,rt information on the internet

PROCESS: linguistics (in/out group words, use of plain
fol k speech, propagarrda tools, moreuseofadv/adj,b.ad
logic, unwammtedemapolabon)

OUTPUT: Specialized collection of articles relevant to an
org's strategic: aims/goals; enables analysis of current
policytrajectories.

#12 / CONFIDENCE: Hardware &
Software

PROCESS: Analyze Information to identify
misinformation, predict potential future scenarios, and
coordinate findings with NATO leaders.

SUPPORTED TECHNOLOGIES : Al Algorithm
OFFERINGS: Identify potential fake news and make
people aware of this label.
TECHNOLOGY: Analyze S6Tlanlia; ln media (ID words
associated with false info based on research) to identify
and label potential fake news and encourage viewer
analysis rather than blind acceptance.

ADVANTAGES: Encoorages thoughtful reading rather
than passi~e reading; Does not outright label but helps
people face news with healthy skepticism

OFFERINGS: Identify misinformation and acquire data
using Al arrd various medical diagnostic devices and
cameras in O!derto predict potential future scenarios and
plan accordingly. (indvdesdefrveryof PPE, medicaltoojs,
etc using unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV)).
TECHNOLOGY: IoT Diagnostic devices, UAV, cameras,
LTE Ce ll, medical diagnostic devices, and AI

UMITATIONS: Like all Al, ma kes assumptions; requires
lots of data, sti ll leaves itup to the reader, may encourage
skepticism of all news, time required for development

#13 / Disparate Media Source
Consolidation

o.FFERINGS: Search engine that. ' .rawls social m. ediaaod
news aggregator services and uses topic query to output a
single Al-generated story containing most sal,eot,
relevant points and informabon
TECHNOLOGY: Massive data aggregation, web crawling,
NLP

I

PROCESS: ' Relevancy" machine leamirig module that has
been trained on a dataset of 200k reports manually
compiled and dassified
SUPPORTED TECHNOLOGIES: Social media feeds

ADVANTAGES: lnlormafon noise reduction, increase
ease of interpretation from va rious dis?arate sour~e s,
intuitiveandu~r friendlyin terface

INPUT: Raw data from the open web
OUTPUT: Corpus of validated facts in multiple media
(text,images,video,ell::. )

#14 / Ground•Truth Knowledge
Base

SUPPORTED TECHNOLOGIES: Cloud storage

TECHNOLOGY: NLP, computer vision, know ledge
extraction engine

TECHNOLOGY: Machineleamiig, web crawling, data
aggregation,statistical analysis

ADVANTAGES: Can be Implemented to detect false
information via linguiStic and visual comparison
LIMITATIONS: Computing power required to parse vast
swathes of Internet media, potential for incorporating
false negatives into knowledge base

INPUT: News articles, images, videos

INPUT: New, Social Media, Governments data

OUTPUT: Percent likelihood of information in question
beingtn.Jthful

OUTPUT: Real -time news updates, trends and
correlations between data points

!t_16_f_BAIIIIA2_ _ _ _~

PROCESS: Different typeS of sensors can send data to the
beacon, and the beacon enrich the data which can be used
for analytics and displayed on the dashboard

OFFERINGS: Real·Time Situation Dashboard

SUPPORTED TECHNOLOGIES: Artificial
intelligence/mad1ine learning, data fusion

PROCESS: Rated based on a rubric as shown below

OFFERINGS; uses variol.is ground-truth measures to
compute likelihood of an article being truthful, final score
generated

PROCESS: Deep neural networks for linguistic and vision
based information e:draction

OFFERINGS: Means of establishing and curating a cor~us
oftn.Jthful information

LIMITATIONS: Need human analyst to en ri ch the
findings

#15 / Confidence Rating Scheme

ADVANTAGES: Al can help form an accurate
representation of future events; tracking people with
bio-sensing devices can track the spread of disease (ex.
COVID)
UMITATIONS: Potentiall y unaoceptable bread! of
privacy; Semantic analysis can be unreliable; Uses past
data-- may not accoont for surprises; Subject to bias

INPUT: RSS feeds, Twitter, (,ooglenews, etc. and user
topicsearchquery
OUTPUT: One consolidated story based on user topic
search query generated via NLP and impact rating (low,
medium,high,extreme)

SUPPORTED TECHNOLOGIES: Existing data centers,
recording technology

SUPPORTED TECHNOLOGIES: Peer·reviewed articles,
scientifically val idated sources, government sources,
social media, news outlets, signal detection theory

TECHNOLOGY: BAM42 is an AOAP (Advanced Data
Analytics Platform), easy to adapt with information
sources and topics
ADVANTAGES: Addresses fake news identification in a
probabilistk rather than binary manner, ability to dispute
scores, participation of users to be more critical of
informabon

ADVANTAGES: Already live and used by various
companies; cost efficient; scalable, secure and flexible.
LIMITATIONS: Still need to add/modify ~Eliminatioo ri
fake news" function; also need to work on ~PredktionsH
fu nction.

LIMITATIONS: Unclear how underlying technologies will
achieve intended goal, Technology Isn't fully though t out or
specified, needs software developed, no learning curve built
in, highcosttodevelopsoftware
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INPUT: Ideas

INPUT: Datasets

OUTPUT: Chart

#17 / Intelligence Engineering

PROCESS: Basically, just follow tile 'Intelligence
Englneering'framewori< and process, fill out charts.

#18 / MIDINT

PROCESS: Aggregating all forms d open-source
intelligence from multiple third parties in a format that is
actionabletodecisionmakers.

SUPPORTEOTECHNOLOGIES: n/a
OFFERINGS: Design to counter misinformation through
detection and Intelligence MIDINT

OFFERINGS: Assessing and addressing COVID-19 via
'Intelligence Engineering' uses HSCB factors, PMESJJ
factors, and PESTLE factors to analysis prolllems. Help
decision makers toma kebetter decisions.
TECHNOLOGY: Intelligence Engineering

ADVANTAGES: Easy to apply, no cost

11:CHNOLOGY : Focus on aggregatir.g all forms d opensource intelligence from multiple third parties in a foon at
thatisactionabletodecisionmakers.

INPUT: Tv,,tter posts

OUTPUT: Decision on whether or not the video Is fake
and reasoning behind decision.

PROCESS: HarvestTwitterd<tta, <1Sse5S tnJstworthir.ess
based oo sem,mtics, create prediction, select optimal
courseof action.

#20 / DeepDetector

SUPPORTED TECHNOLOGIES: ML, AI, and NLP

OFFERINGS: Software lhat detects deep-fakes and tel ls
people v.11y it made the decisiOn that a video was real or
fake.

OFFERINGS: Flags intentionally deceptive information
from social media and recommendsacourseofaction.

Tl:CHNOLOGY: The user prioritizes topics so they will
only be prompted to respond to prevalent
misinfonnalion. System flag s intention;illy deceptive
information and recommends a course of cXtion.

ADV ANTAGES: Used proven technology (likely ready for
use i, 3-5 years), ioeKpensive. Ul gives easy visualiiation
oflocationofneed.

TECHNOLOGY: Detects misinformation in video usir.g
neural network. (software onty)

OFFERINGS: Situatiooal awareness dashboard which
uses data on past disasters to predict futu re disasters

before they occur. This would help world leaders prevent

INPUT: data fr1n1 reputable news outlets and social
media.

INPUT: Data from social media, news oudets, public:
health institutions.

""°"
PROCESS: 1) establish ground tn.ith, 2) assess factors
which wil l influence future, 3) predict different scenariOs.
SUPPORTI:DTECHNOLOGIES: statistical an.;ilysis,
impact analysis, time series analysis

ADVANTAGES: Could theoretic.a lly allow leaders to
prevent disasters before they ocrur.
LIMITATIONS: Undear how accurate software can be at
predicting future, likely not useful technobgy for at least
5-l Oyears.

#22 / Nunki

OUTPUT: l ) Alert to local first responders for situations
which require intervention and 2) alert to NATO if
misinformationisspreadWlg.
PROCESS: Mine data from soeial media, detect
misinformation based on writing style.

OFFERINGS: Processes information from social media,
assesses trustworthiness of information, and alerts fi rst
responders to situations which warrant Intervention.

SUPPORTI:DTECHNOLOGIES: NLP, Al(softwareonly)

TECHNOLOGY: Detects misinformation based on writir.g
style. Processes information from text messages, emails,
video, social media and alerts authorities if a situation
requires invention.

ADVANTAGES: Detects misinformation before it has
spread and alerts NATO as soon as it starts spreading.
software will "natively" undefStand over SO lar,guages.

TECHNOLOGY: Data fusion fran social media, news
media, and public: health institutions. Ml/Al Is used to
develop a dashboard ot relevant events ood help
decision-makers respond to impactful events quickly.

ADVANTAGES: Proven technology, likely ready for use in
<lyear.
UMITAllONS: Requirec; signific.ant human involvement,
expensive.

OUTPUT: Metadata consisting of tags of who/what
appears, and what people are talking about

#24 / Tracking Disinformation
Online

PROCESS: Takes in, analyzes input videos, and outputs
tagged videos and their corre!ipOl"ld ing extracted
information
SUPPORTED TECHNOLOGIES : OSINT and l)Ublicvldeo
newsfeeds

OFFERINGS: A machine leaming/computer vision
system that instantly analyzes imilges/videos for
misin formation
TECHNOLOGY: Ml/a:rnputer vision system

INPUT: topic, claim

OUTPUT: Authenticity Index, Maturity Index
PROCESS: Input news, articles or even videos, double
check with facts in the knowledge-Dase, output
authenticity index
SUPPORTED TECHNOLOGIES: ArMdal
intelligence/machine learning, SG, natural processing
algorithms

ADVANTAGES: TRL 7·9. work.intimatelywithrustomers
toftttheirneecls
UMITATIONS: for business, not publ ic use, does not
analyze teKt-based news sources

INPUT: News article

OUTPUT: information about the topic, statistics about
that information

#46 / Logically Intelligence
Dashboard

PROCESS: Algorithms aggregate data, sources are
evaluated by a combination of AI and employed fact
checkers

OFFERINGS: d.'lstbo.)rd for decision makers that for a given topic
...... ~ the n'llllll r,rM- lnfonnaHon l'Ath lmflllrta nl staH~ks
likeaedibility.adlvit-.,.andth-eat~atta<:hed.lrtormation

SUPPORTI:O TECHNOLOGIES: Al/machirie learning,
social media, data visualiZalion

idemffiedashlghttreatis,,..wab!ealoneifpreferred.Anotherpatt

OFFERINGS: High accurate intelligent rake new detector
and remediatortool
TECHNOLOGY: Artificial Intelligence, 5G, madline
learning, nabJral 1>rocessing algorithms, black chain
algorithms

SUPPORTED TECHNOLOGIES: ML, AI

INPUT: Videos/newsfeeds

UMITATIONS: Unclear how this technology detects
misinformation in video.

#45 / mLAi Analytics

OUTPUT: Early alerts to highly impactful events. Visualize
location, nature, and severity of event. Allow leaders to
respond quickly.

PROCESS! n/a
OFFERINGS: Dashboard with early detection arrd real·
lime updates on impactful events (i.e., emergency,
security) around the world. Vrsualiie location, nature,
andseverityofevent.

INPUT: Social media posts/ livestreams ( instagram,
twitter, facebook)

#23 / Smart Geo-Chronolocated Alerts
SOiution for Pandemic Situations

ADVANTAGES: Curn;,-it prototype with 95·98% accuracy
using minimal resources, ready for use now and
inexpensive.
UMITATIONS: Only useful in very spedfic situations.

afldrespondtodisasters(disease, natural,etc.).
TECHNOLOGY: Text minirig, neural networl(s,
corr~ation, regression, ML, Monte car10 simulations,
stochastic optimization

PROCESS: Neural network
SUPPORTED 11:CHNOLOGIES: Transparent neural
network, deepfake

UMITATIONS : user has ID guess at what topics will
become important Undear how they evaluate intent
behind posts

OUTPUT: Predict disasters and recommend course of

#21 / Situation Dashboard

ADVANTAGES: cost efficient

INPUT: Video footage

OUTPUT: Sends a recommendation on how to respond to
intentionallydeceptiveinformation.

User-defined filters allow for priOfitization.

SUPPORTED 11:CHNOLOGIES: Artificial
intelligence/machine learning, etc.

UMITATIONS: Undear as to how the solution works or
what the intended purpose is; insufficient information
provided

UMITATIONS: Intelligence Engineering is a way of how to
tackle problems, not a new tedmology

#19 / iTRUST

OUTPUT: Presentable way that hasdecisiOn making
meaning

ADVANTAGES Already coHaborate with Can<ICl<t
government, can detect false news at an early stage
before it becomes widespread. :

<Jfthed"51'1t>o.trdllllOW>fcr"dlNmb>bcef"(e,cd,.,ndllllirtormation
thiltt.lsmade lhetl;i,lmo,illbetlsplayed .. lonllwlthstll~stlcs.The
~=•d"~~mti\lilijOfltei;hrtque,i;fvrinfurm;ibon

ew,luiition{somelsdonebyemployees)

UMITATIONS: Algorithms' capability, how to make sure
the accuracy in "'knowleclgebase'? What about new facts
not inthe "knowledgebase"

ADVANTAGES:better information for decision makers,
effectiVely monitor.; the creation and spread of
information threats

TECHNOLOGY : ~l<J<lrithms 1'vr da,t, ~we<,>tion, Al for source

UMITAllONS: the amount of data that needs ID be
processed is excessive, a 70 person staff seems
insufficient
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INPUT: Vldeos/newsfeeds
INPUT: Data/text-based news articles
OUTPUT: Metaclata consisting of ragsofwho/wtiat
appears, and what people are talking about

#25 / The NEMESIS System

PROCESS: Input media and specify the groups you want
to establiSh, run through netWOrk, output hierarct,y of
individuals

OUTPUT: Clustering of false/true information

#26 / Data Analysis ofTextual

Content

PROCESS : Input data, run through algorithms, output
whetherdatais false/real
SUPPORTED TECHNOLOGIES: ML, varioos crawler5

OFFERINGS: Neural networl,;; aJgofithms which track the

SUPPORTED TECHNOLOGIES: Artificial
intelligence/machine learning

path of information spread through individuals, groups,

and teams
TECHNOLOGY: Neural network/Al--each node

represents an individual person, so the output shows a
weigh ling oflmportmce per person

ADVANTAGES: Malysis for path of false info spread is
unique compared to the typical false news detector

OFFERINGS: Disseminates text-based info and
categorizes by fake/real based on many different types of
ML features
TECHNOLOGY: ML algorithm that takes into acco,mt a
variety of features; as well as a visual dashboard to
monitor the sources

LIMITATIONS: Visualizes spread of information, but does
not address how exactly it wi ll mitigate fake news

ADVANTAGES: Usesmorefeal\Jresthanthetypicaltype,
indudir,g virality, entities, relations between
reader/writer and spread of news, emotion analysis, and
types of language
LIMITATIONS: Data analysis based on
features/subjective ideas of fake news

INPUT: Strategic goals and supporting data/information
OUTPUT: Estimated degrees of validity of information
and an interactive analysis program to help determine
different courses of action based on varying degrees of
reliable info

INPUT: geospatial data, temporal data, link analysis,
public records search, sentiment, and topics of interest

#27 / Database for Reliable

Information
OFFERIN6S:Intemet search appliealion that sorts

fake/real info and displays only relevant information
feeds

OUTPUT: Comprehensive set of infom,ation based on
whattheuserissearchingfor
PROCESS: Collects articles, analyzes for fake/real,
displays 'good' news sources
SUPPORTED TECHNOLOGIES: Artificial
intelligence/machine learning

TECHNOLOGY: SAASapplieation that'examinesmultiple

data sources tli rough advariced st:itistical, linguistic, and
crowd-sourcing t£dlniques

#28 / Information Assessment
Dashboard Elements

ADVANTAGES: Ccmpatt>le in multiple
languages/countries, great source for reliable info
LIMITATIONS: Uridear what their criteria is

OFFERINGS: Help leaders interpret reliabil ity and value
of large swaths of information to aid in planning and
decision making

PROCESS : I. 'X·@y vision mind map' based on specified
map of goals and supporting data; 2. 'Al-based
information corroboration' info is evaluated by reliability;
3. 'True/false slider' alters the accuracy of the intelligence
to demonstrate how changes impact plans and
assumptions; 4. 'COA visualization' to understand how
logistics, lime, and space impact result
SUPPORnD TECHNOLOGIES: Artificial intelligence and
simulators

TECHNOLOGY: Artificial intelligence and COA
simulations
ADVANTAGES: AA multifaceted approach to fake
news·-incorporates a multi-step process of
discriminating, analyzing, and determining future
scenarios for planning
LIMITATIONS: Unclear how the AI disseminates
information

INPUT: topic, daim, mass news data

INPUT: Information (news reporting and data)

OUTPUT: information about the topic, statistics about
that information

#29 / Intelligence Dashboard
OFFERINGS: Dashboard for decision makers that for a
given topic will show the most prevalent information with

important st:itistics like cred ibility, activity, and threat
level attached. Information identified as high threat is

PROCESS: algorithms aggregate data, sources are
evaluatt!d by a combination of AI and employed fact
checkers
SUPPORTED TECHNOLOGIES: Al/machine lea ming,
social media, data visualization, news reporting

viewable alone if preferred. Another part of the
dashboard allows for a claim to be entere<I, and all
information that has made the claim will be displayed

OUTPUT: Identify fal<e/rea~ describe the situation dearly,
advise on next movement

#30 / Exonaut

PROCESS: ingest and then present information, use
algorithm to discern fake/real

OFFERINGS: Crisis Management software/interface that

SUPPORTEO TECHNOLOGIES: Al/machine leamir19,
news reporting

am Identify fake news, and advise on how to fight it;
shows a dear Common Operating Pictl.lre, I.e. a11 of the
information about a situation, to aid decision making

along with statistics. The dashboard also suggests
mitigation techniques for information threats

ADVANTAGES: better llforrnation fOl""decision makers,
effectively monitors the creation and spread of
information threats

TECHNOLOGY: algorithms for data aggregation, data
visualization, AI for source evaluation (some is dooe by
employees)

LIMITATIONS: the amount of data that needs to be
processed is excessive, some'Mlat limited by manual
evaluation

TECHNOLOGY: Algorithm to detect true/false
information, aggregate and present information to
decision makers in an easy to comprehend way

INPUT: Infection Reports, Hospital Inventories

OFFERINGS: Gathers infection reports whileaecounting
for reliability, collects hospital inventory reports, creates
a dashboard that visualizes predictions of stress on
hospitals and their current resourcestal\Js
TECHNOLOGY: Algorithm that can intake, process, and
visualize data, make predictions based oo existing
information

PROCESS: conS1Jmes reports to make predictions d
pressure on hospitals, consumes inventories and diSplays
the information in a more accessible and easier to
comprehend way

OUTPUT: data veracity evaluation

#32 / DEC[A]IDE

SUPPORTED TECHNOLOGIES: news reporting, data
visualization methods

OFFERINGS: AI detection of incorrect information
reported for crisis managers, using the data attributes
(not fake news or disinfom,ation, but mistakes in official
recordkeeping, i.e.,typosandmisentereddata)

ADV ANT AG ES: Can he'.p deal with the pandemic very
directly

TECHNOLOGY: AI algorithm

LIMITATIONS: It is not dear how the reliability of an
infection report can be gauged, they don't lie on purpose

LIMITATIONS: AI seems unfeasib~ and it l"IE!eds to be fed
so limited usefulness

INPUT: datll

OUTPUT: Visualization of hospital inventories and
predicted Stress on hospitals

#31 / Network Centric
Healthcare

ADVANTAGES: Better information for decision makers,
identifies fake information easily (assuming it worts)

PROCESS: AI algorithm evaluation of data based on its
attributes
SUPPORTEO TECHNOLOGIES: Artificial Intelligence,
spreadsheet software

ADVANTAGES: improves the reliability of the
information decision makers receive, and faster than the
curren t byhandspeed
LIMITATIONS: AI seems like it might be unfeasible, the
main reason tha t these mistakes have to be checked by
hand is that there's a lot of factors invONed, maybe too
many for an AI
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INPUT: cro~sourced photo/video information, social
media and surveillance feeds

INPUT: AJI gOl/emment messages, pJinVmedia articles,
scientific literature

OUTI'UT: dashboard of information for decision makers

#33 / COVID·19 MAP Media
Analytics Platform
OFFERINGS: dashboard for decision makers that
monitors all aspects of the spread of information {about
COVID) and predicts what and how other topics wiN

spread
TECHNOLOGY: data aggregation, probability modeling
softv;are

OUTPUT: visualization of spread of information,
predictionoffuturespread
PROCESS: probabilistic model to calrulate spread,
softwarej.Jstprocessestherest
SUPPORTED TECHNOLOGIES : news reporting, social
media, internet information shanng
ADVANTAGES: Will advise NATO in spreading real news
and slowing the spread of fake news, it can predict
information spreading in general for better decision
making

#34 /

Visual Media Dashboard

OFFERINGS: Oilshbwrd for decision makers that
presents information in the form of photo/video coo tent
(uploaded by the public or private data sources) along
with social media and surveillance feeds, it win also filter
outfalsedata
TECHNOLOGY : extant software, data aggregation tools,
machine learning

LIMITATIONS: tracking and predicting the spread seems
maybe Impossible

INPUT: Social Media Posts, Multimedia

OFFERINGS: Profiling high-quantity high-intensity fake
news spreaders, measure emotional response to news
TECHNOLOGY: Analyse multimodal content (images,

audiO, video) and attempting to measure emotional

response.

PROCESS: Goes through trained MLmodej, mcx:lel gives
recommendation

OFFERINGS: Narrative and source Identification on social
me:lia websites (e.g., Twitter), pings with update to
selected topic
TECHNOLOGY: WOfd embedding (mapping

words/?1Jr<1ses to real vector). Detection of key .ictors
(pre-processing to improve data). Clustering Algorithms
in high n-dimensions

PROCESS: Condenses all data into single format, tagging
with location, flagging for false information, display on UI
SUPPORTED TECHNOLOGIES: Variety of ML
techniques, (RNNs, CNNs, unsupervised ciustering)

OFFERINGS: Common Operational ?icture with built .,
classifier for fake news (mainly false geospatial
informatk>n)
TECHNOLOGY: Previous COP software, ~Catalogue
Harvester• to decide wha t to lndude In COP

ADVANTAGES: Integration of visualization and detection
of false infom,aton

UMITATIONS : Could be hard to quantify or otherwise
meaningfully measure emotion, though sentiment cl
wordscanbeanalysed

LIMITATIONS: Does not go into detail what
features/dassifiers the ML mOOel will use to flag false
information, analytics could be costly

INPUT: Social Media Posts, Post Metadata

INPUT: Posts, Sources, Multimedia (pictures, videos)

OUTPUT: Ouster related topics, Find key users

#37 / NexaSecurity

ADVANTAGES: aifsdecisionmakers, NATO gets
personally verified informatiofl
LIMITATIONS : it is not dear how it is going to judge
true/false as the machine learning is for data processing;
people might not be okay with surveillance/more watched
surveillance

OUTPUT: Display summarizing all info

#36 / WES ML-based Service for
Information Validation

SUPPORTED TECHNOLOGIES: Neural ~twork, lexicoo
based approach

ADVANTAGES: Mdresses the emotional and multimodal
context. which other solutions may not touch on. An ML
can also be very effective if given accurate, venfiable
troiningdata

SUPPORTED TECHNOLOGIES: (surveillance and
personal) cameras, mactiine learning, social media, data
ann....,,ationtools

INPUT: Sources can be registered by end user, accessed
through a web appfol1owing REST API

OUTPUT: Likelihood cl being fake, Likelihood of spreader
being a serial sourceoffake news

#35 / Profiling fake news
spreaders on Social Media

PROCESS: Predictive Intelligences intakes the
information, filters out the false, uses madline lea mir,g
algorithms to process the rest and then display it in an
interface

PROCESS: Clusters related tweets next to each other,
label those clusters, also makes map of twitter user
interactions
SUPPORTED TECHNOLOGIES: Neural Network,
UnsupervisedMLforclustenng

ADVANTAGES: Unsupervised ML models allow
classification and training without needing to labeldiita, a
time coosuming and biased process, detecting narrative
live can help catch fake r.ews faster

OUTPUT: Impact on COV!Dc.ises, what info is fulse

#38 / Context•aware Information fusion
verification framework for situation assessment
OFFERINGS: Make predictions using input dat.i,
detecting false data through heterogeneous swrces, fact
checkingandanomalydetection
TECHNOLOGY: Generative probabilistic modeling,
Eicisting fact-checking algorithms, Situation assessment
forcontextdues

PROCESS: Link heterogenous info, filter out fake data,
make l)fedictions, filter again with anomaly detection
SUPPORTED TECHNOLOGIES: Al, existing fact checking
algorithms

ADVANTAGES: Uses multiple sourres, and attempts
anomaly detection for fake news
LIMITATIONS : Mul~ple sources can still have bias issue in
training data, prediction seems hard to do acrurately
based on heterogeneous data

LIMITATIONS: Does not directly detect fake news, but
shows you all narratives, analytics could be costly

INPUT: News articles
INPUT: Anonymous submissions from front-line workers
OUTPUT: Vark>us groupi1gs cl articles, propaganda
analyst form

score, manual

OUTPUT: Ousters of concern

#39 / PULSE

PROCESS: Use clustenng algorittlm to fnd potential
groups in responses

#40 / Propaganda

Awareness

PROCESS: Find key topics and combinations of topics,
display in graphs to ilcl: as filters, assess likelihood each of
article being propaganda.

SUPPORTED TECHNOLOGIES: NLP, Unsupel'Vised Ml
SUPPORTED TECHNOLOGIES; n/a

OFFERINGS: Ousterir19 information <md urgent,
unacldressed issues directly through submissions from

front-line workers
TECHNOLOGY: Clustering in various behavioral
dimensions, based on PESTLE framework

ADVANTAGES;Getting liveinputclissuesdirecttyfrom
front-line workers automatically clustered helps make
decision making more effective. Unsupervised ML models
allow classification and training without needing to label
data,atimeconsumingandb@sedprocess.
LIMITATIONS: Effectiveness of dustering using PESllE
unknown

OFFERINGS: Identify potential propaganda fo r further
manual analysis, fill out military risk form
TECHNOLOGY: Crawler to grab articlel:, Simple
algorithm to identify potential propaganda, Future ML
algorithm to auto fill military risk form

ADVANTAGES:Integration of filling out form with
identifyingkeyarticles.
UMITATJONS: Does not address how their algorithm
successfully iclen~ftespotential propaganda
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INPUT: Data, informatioo

INPUT: Information

OUTPUT: Insights from the data or information provided

#41 / METIS

PROCESS: Input data, analyze, find meaningful insights,
visuali.:e in dashboiird, reports, <1udit logs
SUPPORTED TECHNOLOGIES: Artificial Intelligence,

Machine leamirg, predictive a~orithms
OFFERINGS: Augmented JntelligerlCe, help decision

makers to Quickty analyze all the data and find meaningful
insights from it
TECHNOLOGY: Artili:ial Intel~gence, Machine Learning,
predictive algorithms

ADVANT AGES: Get i'lsightful information from exist data,
help decision makers to make better decisions.

LIMITATIONS: How accurate the predictions still need to
be validated, and it.did l'\Otexplainhowdoesthe
technology real work

OUTPUT: Scoreof-lOOto 100in 6categories

#42 / True/False Information Tool
OFFERINGS: tool that analy:res susceptjb ility to
true/false information and provides confidence ratings on
the individual's situational awareness. Measures how
well an individual is able to choose between true/false
statements and then how they accept the relevant
information as part ofdecisionmaking.
TECHNOLOGY: Signaldetecoon theory, Tool (assumably
app butnotspedfied)

OUTPUT: Plan to mitigote effects of fake news.

OUTPUT: Oustering of false/true information

#43 / OUTLINE

#44 / Select Optimal Course of
Action

SUPPORTED TECHNOLOGIES: ML

TECHNOLOGY: ML algorithm that takes into account a

v11riety of features; as well as a visual dashboard to
monitor the sources

ADVANTAGES: Uses more features than the typical type,
induding virality, entities, relations between
reader/writer and spread of news, emotion ar.alysis, and
typesoflongu<19e
UMITATIONS: Some features like emotions might not be
reliableindicatorsoffake/real

PROCESS: n/a
SUPPORTED TECHNOLOGIES : Causal inference,
AnticipatOl"Y thinking, structural eousal models, Prospect

Toeo,y

OFFERINGS: Disseminates text·based info and

categoriles by fake/real based on many different types of
Ml features

ADVANTAGES:Hasbeen used successfully previously,
increase individuals situational awareness
UMITATIONS : Technology Isn't fu lly thought out or
specified, needs software developed, no learning curve
built in

INPUT: Articles shared on Twitter and Facebool<.

INPUT: Oata/text-based news articles

PROCESS: Input data, run through algorithms, output
whetherdatais false/real

PROCESS: concise probe statements with 4 fast

respoco,,
SUPPORTeDTECHNOLOGIES: Internet, news
applications

OFFERINGS: I dentify fake news events, predict their
impact and recommend optimal course of action to
address the fake news
TECHNOLOGY: Gather data, determine truthfulness of
statements on a spectrum, predict future developments,
selectoptimalcourseofaction

ADVANTAGES:Well-explained methocl for evaluating
truthfulness
LIMITATIONS: o portfol io, no evidence that team has the
ability to actually make the stuff they're talking about
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